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 Résumé de l'article
En s’appuyant sur le récent litige « Occupy » dans l’affaire Batty c
City of Toronto (Batty), cet article montre que le judiciaire
canadien n’a plus de compréhension solide des biens communs,
ni des droits qui y sont associés. Ce manque de compréhension
judiciaire en matière de biens communs est à peine surprenant
compte tenu la focalisation de la théorie sur la propriété privée,
et particulièrement la propriété privée individuelle. Cet article
soutient qu’au lieu d’utiliser l’analogie traditionnelle, selon
laquelle le gouvernement détient les biens communs en fiducie
pour le public, Batty se fonde sur une analogie qui considère le
gouvernement comme propriétaire. L’émergence de cette
dernière compréhension des biens communs peut être retracée
à la jurisprudence de la Cour Suprême du début des années
1990. Bien que l’analogie gouvernement comme propriétaire ait
été introduite par un jugement concurrent, des décisions plus
récentes de la Cour Suprême l’ont réitérée. Une telle
compréhension de la propriété est une tentative évidente de
forcer tout le droit des biens dans un modèle de propriété privée,
et d’accentuer les droits des propriétaires par-dessus tous les
autres droits reliés à la propriété. Cet article soutient que
l’analogie gouvernement comme propriétaire est problématique
puisqu’elle met l’accent sur l’usage que fait le gouvernement des
biens communs, et non les bienfaits publics qui en ressortent.
L’article appelle ainsi à un retour à l’analogie fiduciaire des biens
communs.
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 This article uses the recent Occupy litiga-
tion of Batty v. City of Toronto to argue that 
Canadian courts no longer have a robust under-
standing of common property and its attendant 
rights. The lack of judicial understanding of 
common property is hardly surprising given 
property theory’s focus on private property, par-
ticularly individual private property. This arti-
cle argues that rather than use the traditional 
analogy of governments holding common prop-
erty in trust for the public, Batty relies on an 
analogy of common property which treats the 
government as an owner. The emergence of the 
latter understanding of common property can 
be traced to Supreme Court jurisprudence from 
the early 1990s. Although the government-as-
owner analogy of common property was intro-
duced in a concurring judgment, more recent 
Supreme Court decisions have since reiterated 
the analogy. Such an understanding of common 
property is a clear attempt to force all property 
into a private property model and emphasize 
the rights of owners above all other rights in 
property. This article argues that the govern-
ment-as-owner analogy is problematic given its 
emphasis on the government’s use of property 
rather than the public’s benefit from common 
property and calls for a return to the trust anal-
ogy of common property. 
En s’appuyant sur le récent litige « Oc-
cupy » dans l’affaire Batty c City of Toronto 
(Batty), cet article montre que le judiciaire ca-
nadien n’a plus de compréhension solide des 
biens communs, ni des droits qui y sont asso-
ciés. Ce manque de compréhension judiciaire en 
matière de biens communs est à peine surpre-
nant compte tenu la focalisation de la théorie 
sur la propriété privée, et particulièrement la 
propriété privée individuelle. Cet article sou-
tient qu’au lieu d’utiliser l’analogie tradition-
nelle, selon laquelle le gouvernement détient les 
biens communs en fiducie pour le public, Batty 
se fonde sur une analogie qui considère le gou-
vernement comme propriétaire. L’émergence de 
cette dernière compréhension des biens com-
muns peut être retracée à la jurisprudence de la 
Cour Suprême du début des années 1990. Bien 
que l’analogie gouvernement comme proprié-
taire ait été introduite par un jugement concur-
rent, des décisions plus récentes de la Cour Su-
prême l’ont réitérée. Une telle compréhension 
de la propriété est une tentative évidente de 
forcer tout le droit des biens dans un modèle de 
propriété privée, et d’accentuer les droits des 
propriétaires par-dessus tous les autres droits 
reliés à la propriété. Cet article soutient que 
l’analogie gouvernement comme propriétaire est 
problématique puisqu’elle met l’accent sur 
l’usage que fait le gouvernement des biens 
communs, et non les bienfaits publics qui en 
ressortent. L’article appelle ainsi à un retour à 
l’analogie fiduciaire des biens communs. 
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Introduction 
 “How do we live together in a community? How do we share common 
space?” These questions opened Justice Brown’s judgment in Batty v. City 
of Toronto and were prompted by the Occupy movement’s “occupation” of 
a park in downtown Toronto.1 Despite these opening lines, the decision in 
Batty does not deliver the promised discussion of common space. Instead, 
Batty repeatedly defers to private property rights or the rights of the city 
of Toronto in its role as manager of municipal parks. That is not to say 
that Batty reached the wrong decision but to say that Batty reached the 
right decision for the wrong reasons, and rather than taking common 
property rights seriously—particularly the public’s right not to be exclud-
ed from such property2— the case upholds individual private property as 
the only acceptable way to think about property. 
 It is the purpose of this article to explore the state of common property 
in Canada. I argue that in cases dealing with issues of what would tradi-
tionally be understood as common property, such as streets and parks, 
Canadian courts have shown themselves to have a weak understanding of 
such property. By weak understanding, I mean that the courts have pre-
ferred to force instances of common property into a private property model 
rather than delineating what rights exist for common property qua com-
mon property. The resulting picture of common property emphasizes the 
state’s role as regulator of such property or, less often, the impact of com-
mon property on private property rights. The unease that Canadian 
courts have with common property appears to stem from questions over 
ownership. I argue that this unease is hardly surprising due to two fac-
tors. First, the conventional categorization of property tacitly assumes 
that individually owned private property is the base-line model or original 
form of property.3 Second, the conventional categorization’s tacit assump-
tions about private property are compounded by the dominant theory of 
property as taught in law schools and promoted by academics. This theo-
ry, generally known as the bundle of rights theory,4 has in recent years 
                                                  
1   Batty v Toronto (City of), 2011 ONSC 6862 at para 1, 108 OR (3d) 571, [Batty]. 
2   I use the term common property to mean instances of public property which are open to 
the public. My definition of common property and choice of terminology are explained 
below (infra notes 20 to 50 and accompanying text). 
3   Elinor Ostrom & Charlotte Hess, “Private and Common Property Rights” in Boudewijn 
Bouckaert, ed, Property Law and Economics, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 2nd 
ed (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010) 53 at 53-54. This argument is further explored 
below. 
4   For academic discussions of this theory see Tony Honoré, “Ownership” in Making Law 
Bind: Essays Legal and Philosophical (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 161; Thomas W 
Merrill & Henry E Smith, “What Happened to Property in Law and Economics” (2001) 
111:2 Yale LJ 357; JE Penner, “The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture of Property” (1996) 43:3 
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come to concern itself with questions of how best to define and recognize 
ownership of private property.5 Put simply the bundle of rights theory as-
sumes that if a person holds all of the rights then she is the owner of the 
property.6 The question of ownership of common property is much more 
complex than ownership of private property because whatever rights 
there are to common property, they are shared among the population and 
between the public and the government. Rather than struggle with the 
complexity of common property, Canadian courts have sought to simplify 
the issue and force all forms of property into a private property model.7 
 There are two paradigmatic ways to understand common property. 
The first is the trust analogy whereby the common property is described 
as being held in trust by the government for the benefit of the public. The 
trust analogy has the same roots as the American public trust doctrine, 
but in Canada, the idea of a public trust is much weaker and less devel-
oped than in the United States.8 Hence, to avoid confusion with the more 
powerful American public trust doctrine, I call the Canadian version “the 
trust analogy”.9 The trust analogy is one with a long history,10 but this ar-
ticle argues that it has since been replaced with the government-as-owner 
      
UCLA L Rev 711. For a discussion of this theory in law textbooks see Bruce Ziff, Princi-
ples of Property Law, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 2-3; Daniel H Cole & Peter Z 
Grossman, Principles of Law and Economics 2nd ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2011) 
at 109-110. See also Michael A Heller, “The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law” (2001) 
2:1 Theor Inq L 79 at 92, [Heller, “Dynamic Analytics”]. 
5   Larissa Katz, “Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law” (2008) 58:3 UTLJ 275 [Katz, 
“Exclusion and Exclusivity]; Thomas W Merrill, “Property and the Right to Exclude” 
(1998) 77:4 Neb L Rev 730; Merrill & Smith, supra note 5 at 385-387. 
6   This is further explored infra notes 54-75  and accompanying text. 
7   See Parts II and III. 
8   Constance D Hunt, “The Public Trust Doctrine in Canada” in John Swaigen, ed, Envi-
ronmental Rights in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) 151 at 151-56, 166; Barbara 
von Tigerstrom, “The Public Trust Doctrine in Canada” (1997) 7:3 J Envtl L & Prac 379 
at 380-81; John C Maguire, “Fashioning an Equitable Vision for Public Resource Pro-
tection and Development in Canada: The Public Trust Doctrine Revisited and Recon-
ceptualized” (1997) 7:1 J Envtl L & Prac 1 at 2-7; Kate Penelope Smallwood, Coming 
out of Hibernation: The Canadian Public Trust Doctrine (LLM Thesis, University of 
British Columbia Faculty of Law, 1993) [unpublished] at 12-42, 78-93. 
9   This term also has the benefit of emphasising that an actual trust is not created and 
therefore the law that applies to private trusts does not apply to property held under 
the trust analogy. The question of whether or not private trust law applies to public 
trusts seems uncertain, though the consensus leans towards the claim that it does not, 
Hunt, supra note 9 at 175; von Tigerstrom, supra note 9 at 393; Smallwood, supra note 
8 at 108. 
10   Hunt, supra note 8 at 151-56; Maguire, supra note 8 at 2-7; Smallwood, supra note 8 at 
12-42, 78-93. See Vancouver (City of) v Burchill, [1932] SCR 620 at 625, [1932] 4 DLR 
200, [Burchill]. 
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analogy, where the government’s use of the property is more important 
than the public benefit. The government-as-owner analogy first appeared 
in The Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada and has 
since come to dominate discussions of common property.11 These two par-
adigms often overlap but the key difference lies in the deference that the 
latter shows to the government “as owner” of the property. 
 Before I explore how Batty handled the issues of common property it is 
necessary to define common property and differentiate it from other kinds 
of property. In the first part of this article, I argue that the conventional 
“analytics” of property,12 particularly the categorization of property, tacit-
ly assumes that private property is the baseline model of property. In con-
trast to this, I argue that C.B. Macpherson’s categorization of property 
and definition of common property avoids the emphasis on private proper-
ty seen in the conventional understanding, and for this reason, I use Mac-
pherson’s definition of common property in this article.13 The first section 
also argues that the dominant understanding of the bundle of rights theo-
ry is primarily concerned with the owner’s use and control of his property, 
which is a definition better suited to private property rather than to com-
mon property. Taken together, the conventional categorization and theory 
of property struggle to understand common property as anything other 
than a subcategory of private property,14 yet Macpherson’s work shows 
that this does not have to be the case. The second part of the article exam-
ines the weakened understanding of common property in Batty and why, 
despite some initial reasons for optimism in the analysis of the property 
issues, the case ultimately defers to irrelevant private property concerns. 
Such an outcome is hardly surprising given recent Canadian jurispru-
dence on common property or potential common property issues. The 
third part examines this recent jurisprudence and argues that the courts 
have shown themselves as being unable to conceptualize the complexity of 
common property and have sought to reduce all forms of property to pri-
                                                  
11   Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v Canada, [1991] 1 SCR 139, 77 DLR 
(4th) 385, [Commonwealth]. I further explore the emergence of this infra notes 134-53 
and accompanying text. 
12   The term “analytics” is borrowed from Heller, “Dynamic Analytics”, supra note 4. 
13   CB Macpherson, “The Meaning of Property” in CB Macpherson, ed, Property: Main-
stream and Critical Positions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) 1 at 4. 
14   Daniel Cole observes that theories of common property are underdeveloped in compari-
son to theories of individual private property or commonly held property, Daniel H Cole, 
“Property Creation by Regulation: Rights to Clean Air and Rights to Pollute” in Daniel 
H Cole & Elinor Ostrom, eds, Property in Land and Other Resources (Cambridge, MA: 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2012) 125 at 126 [Cole, “Property Creation”] [Cole & 
Ostrom, Property]. It should be noted that Cole uses slightly different terminology here 
than I do. For an explanation of the terms I use, see infra notes 16-44 and accompany-
ing text. 
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vate property. The fourth section evaluates proposed solutions and argues 
for a greater emphasis of the public nature of common property. 
I. Kinds of Property and the Bundle of Rights 
 Property is a politically sensitive topic. 15 Thus, any discussion of prop-
erty tends to be riddled with tacit ideological commitments rather than an 
examination of what actually happens.16 Historically, the major point of 
contention in property was and remains the potential benefits and costs of 
private property. In the common law world, John Locke’s belief that prop-
erty emerged from individual action, served to justify the special role that 
the landed proprietor held in society, and thus, the benefits that accrued 
to those with private property.17 Locke’s theory also presents private 
property as something that predates government,18 and fails acknowledge 
the role that others play in recognizing property rights and the fact that 
property can only exist in a system.19 Clearly there is more to property 
than simply private property, but such is the power of private property 
that it dominates both the conventional categorization of property and the 
current understanding of the bundle-of-rights theory. That is to say, pri-
vate property appears as the baseline or original model of property, while 
other forms of property appear as deviations.20 Such a situation makes it 
difficult to take other forms of property seriously because they do not ap-
pear to conform to property theory. I begin this section with an examina-
                                                  
15   Macpherson, supra note 13 at 4. For perhaps exaggerated claims about property’s role 
in political and social battles see Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom (New York; 
Random House, 1999) at xi-xii; Roy Vogt, Whose Property? The Deepening Conflict be-
tween Property and Democracy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) 
at 3. 
16   See for example Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess’s discussion of Henry Sumner 
Maine’s argument about the origins of property, Ostrom & Hess, supra note 4 at 53-54. 
17   Ibid at 54. See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed by CB Macpherson (In-
dianapolis: Hackett, 1980) at 21-23. The continued importance of Locke’s theory can be 
seen in the in-depth treatment that his discussion of property continues to receive: see 
for example Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1988) at 137-252 [Waldron, Private Property]; JE Penner, The Idea of Property in Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) at187-201. 
18   Douglas Sturm, “Property: A Relational Perspective” (1986) 4:2 JL & Religion 353 at 
380-87. Sturm does note that Locke’s theory has been appropriated by both ends of the 
political spectrum and that there are competing readings of Locke’s theory. 
19   Carol M Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory, and Rhetoric of 
Ownership (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) at 37-38. 
20   Historically there was even some doubt over whether non-private property was proper-
ty: Carol M Rose, “Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Proper-
ty in the Information Age” (2003) 66:1-2 Law & Contemp Probs 89 at 91 [Rose, “Ro-
mans”]. 
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tion of how private property dominates the conventional categorization of 
property before moving on to explore how it dominates the bundle-of-
rights theory.21 
 In addition to Locke’s justificatory theory of private property’s origins, 
common law lawyers have tended to believe that private property is 
somehow superior to other forms of property.22 Although these claims of 
private property’s origins, justification, and superiority have long since 
been proven false,23 the conventional categorization of property tacitly 
continues the idea that individual private property is the baseline model 
of property. Even scholars like Elinor Ostrom and Daniel Cole, whose re-
search focuses on the regulation of commonly held resources such as fish-
ing rights or environmental goods,24 inadvertently perpetuate the myth 
that individual private property is the baseline model of property. The 
continued dominance of individual private property becomes clear if we 
compare the “conventional” categorization of property used by Cole and 
Ostrom with C.B. Macpherson’s categorization, and the original civilian 
categories from which both categorizations are drawn.25 
 Both Cole and Ostrom rely on four categories of property—private, 
common, public, and non-property (or open access)26—which Cole calls the 
“conventional typology”.27 Under this categorization, private property is 
the property owned by individuals, and in which individuals have the 
                                                  
21   As the literature on common property and property categories is voluminous, I focus on 
the conventional categorization, which is used by property textbooks and as the starting 
point for discussions of property categorization. See, Ziff, supra note 4 at, 2-3, 7-10; Cole 
& Grossman, supra note 4 at 109-10, 114-16. 
22   Ostorm & Hess, supra note 3 at 53; Daniel H Cole & Elinor Ostrom, “Introduction” in 
Cole & Ostrom, Property, supra note 14, 1 at 2-3. 
23   Ostrom & Hess, supra note 3 at 53-54; Carol M Rose, “Property as the Keystone Right?” 
(1995-1996) 71:3 Notre Dame L Rev 329 [Rose, “Keystone”]. 
24   See Daniel H Cole, “New Forms of Private Property: Property Rights in Environmental 
Goods” in Bouckaert, supra note 4, 225 [Cole, “New Forms”]; Cole, “Property Creation”, 
supra note 14; Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
25   Rose, “Romans”, supra note 20. The categories were imported into the common law via 
Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae [On the Laws and Customs 
of England], ed by Sir Travers Twiss (London: Longman, 1878) vol 1 at 39-41. 
26   Cole, “New Forms”, supra note 24 at 229; Daniel H Cole & Elinor Ostrom, “The Variety 
of Property Systems and Rights in Natural Resources” in Cole & Ostrom, Property, su-
pra note 15, 37 at 42-43 [Cole & Ostrom, “Property Systems”]. 
27   Cole, “New Forms”, supra note 24 at 229. On occasion, other scholars omit non-property 
and refer to the property “trilogy”: see Hanoch Dagan & Michael A Heller, “The Liberal 
Commons” (2000-2001) 110:4 Yale LJ 549 at 555-58; Amnon Lehavi, “Mixing Property” 
(2008) 38:1 Seton Hall L Rev 137 at 139-41. These categories of property are also used 
in the leading Canadian property law textbook, Ziff, supra note 4 at 7-10. 
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right to exclude others from their property. Common property is property 
which is collectively owned and from which “outsiders” can be excluded, 
while public property is “a special form of common property supposedly 
owned by all the citizens, but typically controlled by elected officials or bu-
reaucrats.”28 The final category of property is property which has no own-
er and which anyone can freely use.29 Cole is careful to note that these 
categories of property are ideal types and do not actually exist in their 
pure form.30 In fact, many scholars, including Cole and Ostrom, argue 
that the conventional categories are hopelessly inadequate for the real 
world.31 Nonetheless, both Cole and Ostrom continue to use these four 
kinds of property as the starting point for discussion without seriously ex-
amining the conventional categorization’s implicit biases. 
 The conventional categorization implies that the other forms of prop-
erty are derivatives of individual private property; for example, it empha-
sizes the exclusionary nature of common property, and the fact that public 
property is really controlled by the state. Ostrom and Hess argue that the 
terms “government, private and common property ... better reflect the sta-
tus and organization of the holder of a particular right.”32 What they fail 
to note, however, is that the conventional typology’s emphasis on organi-
zation seeks to maintain the idea that somehow individual private proper-
ty is better or at the very least so fundamentally different that it deserves 
a category of its own. In Pollution and Property, Cole points out that in 
“common parlance ‘private’ property is not counterpoised to ‘common’ 
property as it is in much of the academic literature,” 33 and that some aca-
demics conflate “common property” with other forms of property.34 How-
ever, Cole blames the differences in terminology on “ideological issues 
more than real distinctions,” and argues that the more important issue is 
the oft neglected question of “just what specific rights and corresponding 
duties to the various property regimes entail.”35 While I agree that more 
attention should be paid to the rights and duties that attach to various in-
                                                  
28   Cole, “New Forms”, supra note 24 at 229. 
29   Ibid. See also Lehavi, supra note 27 at 141. 
30   Daniel H Cole, Pollution and Property: Comparing Ownership Institutions for Envi-
ronmental Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 9-13 [Cole, Pol-
lution and Property]. 
31   Ibid at 13; Ostrom & Hess, supra note 3 at 62. See also Heller, “Dynamic Analytics”, 
supra note 4 at 79-89. 
32   Ostrom & Hess, supra note 3 at 62 [emphasis added]. See also Cole, “New Forms”, su-
pra note 24 at 229-30. 
33   Cole, Pollution and Property, supra note 30 at 9. 
34   Ibid at 11-12. 
35   Ibid at 12-13. 
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stances of property, this is unlikely to happen if the conventional typology 
is used due to its tacit assumption that individual private property is the 
baseline model. The dominance of individual private property and its at-
tendant myths makes it harder to examine common property qua common 
property, because common property appears as a corruption of private 
property rather than something inherently different. 
 In contrast to the conventional typology, Macpherson offers a tripar-
tite categorization of property: common, private, and state.36 For Mac-
pherson common property includes things such as streets, parks, and 
highways which “society or the state [declares] ... are for common use.”37 
Each individual has the right not to be excluded from such common prop-
erty subject only to the state’s regulation of their use. The right not to be 
excluded rests on the importance that common property has in the suc-
cessful functioning of a society and of an individual in that society. 38 Pri-
vate property is also the right of an individual but it is the right to exclude 
others from the “use and benefit” of the property in question.39 State prop-
erty is, according to Macpherson, “the assets held by the state acting as a 
corporation.”40 Here Macpherson lists Air France as an example, and giv-
en that Air France has since been nationalized, his definition seems dat-
ed.41 If, however, we understand state property as that property in which 
the state has an interest in excluding others, either for business purposes 
as in the Air France example, or for security purposes, then the category 
continues to make sense. Given this understanding of state property, it is 
likely that army bases and government office buildings, among others, 
will fall into the category of state property. 
 For Macpherson, other kinds of property are not simply derivatives of 
private property.42 Although Macpherson stresses that property rights are 
the rights of individuals, he also emphasizes the role of the state in creat-
ing and enforcing property rights, and thus, tacitly challenges the idea 
that property arose out of individual action.43 Macpherson’s concern is to 
                                                  
36   Macpherson, supra note 13 at 4-5. 
37   Ibid. 
38   Ibid. Such an understanding is also implied in the common law’s historical trust analo-
gy which granted the public certain rights of access to tidal waters and highways for the 
purposes of fishing, navigation, and commerce, Smallwood, supra note 8 at 9-10, 42. 
39   Macpherson, supra note 13 at 5. 
40   Ibid. 
41   Ibid at 5-6. Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller argue that state property has become 
less important since the collapse of many socialist states, however, they use “state prop-
erty” when Cole and others use “public”: Dagan & Heller, supra note 27 at 557-58. 
42   Macpherson, supra note 13 at 9-11. 
43   Ibid at 4-5. 
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offer a categorization of property that recognizes the social aspect of prop-
erty, rather than just the individual. Thus, when compared to the “con-
ventional” typology, Macpherson’s categorization of property seems to bet-
ter reflect the actual social practice of property, given its emphasis on the 
role of society and the state in property rights.44 Conversely, the conven-
tional categorization seems to treat other forms of property as a deviation 
from private property that ought to be made to conform to the private 
property model as far as possible. 
 Asides from their differences in emphasis, the two categorizations dif-
fer in their understanding of common property. For Macpherson common 
property could also be called public property (public-common), whereas 
the conventional typology views common property as a species of private 
property (private-common). In Pollution and Property, Cole recognized 
that common property was a subcategory of both public and private prop-
erty, and though he opted to stick with the “conventional” categorization, 
he was careful to further qualify each type of property and how he used 
it.45 The problem for Cole and Ostrom is that the existence of both private-
common and public-common property conflicts with the conventional cat-
egorization’s attempt to make private-common property a separate cate-
gory. As a result, Cole and Ostrom view legal scholars’ tendency to con-
flate common property with public property as a mistake.46 Cole and 
Ostrom note that even Justinian’s lawyers would confuse the two catego-
ries,47 but if we look at how these two types of property were defined by 
the civil law, we can see that the conventional typology actually has it 
wrong. According to Bracton, res communes were things such as running 
water and air, while res publicae were rivers and ports, though Bracton is 
quick to note that res publicae may also be called res communes.48 Carol 
Rose added a further gloss to these categories by noting that the common 
law tends to vest items of common property such as oceans and air in the 
sovereign, thus they are more like res publicae than res communes.49 The 
problem suffered by the “conventional” typology is its insistence that 
group property rights are so different from individual private property 
                                                  
44   This is arguably in keeping with the arguments advanced by Carol Rose and Joseph 
Singer; see Rose, “Keystone”, supra note 23; Joseph William Singer, “Democratic Es-
tates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society” (2008-2009) 94:4 Cornell L Rev 
1009 at 1010, 1027 [Singer, “Democratic Estates”]. 
45   Cole, Pollution and Property, supra note 30 at 10, 13. 
46   Cole, “New Forms”, supra note 24 at 229-31; Ostrom & Hess, supra note 3 at 55-59; 
Cole & Ostrom, “Property Systems”, supra note 26 at 43-44. 
47   Ibid at 43. 
48   Bracton, supra note 25 at 39-41. 
49   Rose, “Romans”, supra note 20  at 93. 
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that they require a separate category.50 Macpherson’s definition of com-
mon property leaves room for group property rights under private proper-
ty while emphasizing that common property is that property which is held 
for the benefit of the public. I use Macpherson’s definition of common 
property in this article, though I recognize that common property in the 
sense meant by Macpherson is a subcategory of public property. 
 Despite the differences in emphasis between Macpherson’s categories 
and the so-called conventional categories there is some overlap between 
the two. Both agree, for example, that there is a division between public 
and private property, although they differ as to where they draw the line. 
Macpherson’s care to separate “state property” from both private and 
common property leaves more room to limit the extent of the rights that 
the government has to such property. That is, Macpherson is keen to em-
phasize the public obligations inherent in both common and state proper-
ty as well as the state’s role in creating and enforcing property rights.51 In 
this way, Macpherson’s categories more accurately capture how property 
actually operates. Ultimately, his categorization is to be preferred given 
that he strikes a more realistic balance between individual rights and the 
role of society in upholding these rights. That is to say that his under-
standing of property is compatible with what Jennifer Nedelsky has called 
“relational autonomy” and is arguably compatible with recent calls for a 
more “progressive” understanding of property.52 
 However, regardless of which typology is used, the categories of prop-
erty are overly simplistic and cannot account for instances of overlap.53 
Even the public-private divide is not as clear-cut as it might first appear. 
None of the categorizations of property leave room for privately-owned 
properties like inns and taverns which, under the common law, had a 
longstanding obligation to offer food and shelter to any and all travel-
lers.54 The various categorizations of property also leave no room for the 
                                                  
50   Corporate property would fall under individual private property due to corporate per-
sonhood, a point which Macpherson explicitly recognized, Macpherson, supra note 13 at 
5. 
51   It should go without saying that public property has public obligations: see Waldron, 
Private Property, supra note 17 at 40-41. 
52   Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 3, 9-11, 38-65, 163; Gregory S Alexander et 
al, “A Statement of Progressive Property” (2009) 94:4 Cornell L Rev 743. 
53   Cole, “New Forms”, supra note 24 at 229-31; Cole & Ostrom, “Property Systems” supra 
note 26 at 37; Lehavi, supra note 27 at 211; Heller, “Dynamic Analytics”, supra note 4 
at 82-89. 
54   Joseph William Singer, “No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private 
Property” (1996) 90:4 Nw UL Rev 1283 at 1291-93 [Singer, “No Right to Exclude”]; AK 
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more recent innovation of shopping centres and malls which, while pri-
vately owned, are open to the public. Such forms of property might be 
more appropriately referred to as publicly accessible private property, ra-
ther than just “private property.” Similarly, Macpherson’s categories do 
not shed any light on apparent privatizations of common property repre-
sented by entities such as business improvement districts (BIDs) which 
lobby governments for improvements of the common property adjacent to 
their business interests.55 BIDs seem to imply that some individuals, due 
to the location of their private property rights, have additional rights to 
comment on and influence the use of common property. 
 The issues raised by BIDs also point to a further problem with at-
tempts to categorize property: how do the categories relate to one anoth-
er? Is it the case that private property will have more of a say in how ad-
jacent common property is used? In order to properly understand the 
complexity of property, we need to know more than just the kinds of prop-
erty that exist; we need to know how property operates. Property is, after 
all, a system of governance because it controls how and who can access 
what resources, and for how long.56 The bundle of rights theory of proper-
ty provides answers to these questions of access and use, but as we shall 
see, its current understanding relies on a bounded vision of property that 
isolates each piece of property from all others as far as possible, and that 
also overemphasizes the role of individual action in creating and main-
taining property. 
 The rights typically included in the bundle-of-rights theory are the 
right to exclude, the right to use, the right to possession and so on, but not 
all of these rights are considered equally important.57 If an individual 
owns a piece of property, it is likely that that individual will have all, or 
most of the rights listed in the bundle; but if an individual only has a 
right to use a piece of property, that individual will not have access to all 
of the bundled rights in relation to that property.58 Of all the rights in the 
      
Sandoval-Strausz, “Travelers, Strangers, and Jim Crow: Law, Public Accommodations, 
and Civil Rights in America” (2005) 23:1 LHR 53. 
55   Susanna Schaller & Gabriella Modan, “Contesting Public Space and Citizenship: Impli-
cations for Neighborhood Business Improvement Districts” (2005) 24:4 Journal of Plan-
ning Education & Research 394 at 394-96; see also Lehavi, supra note 27 at 188-89. 
56   Jeremy Waldron, “Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom” (1991) 39:1 UCLA L Rev 
295 at 296 [Waldron, “Homelessness”]. 
57   Tony Honoré calls these rights the “standard incidents of ownership” and lists “eleven 
leading incidents”, Honoré, supra note 4 at 165. Michael Heller notes that Honoré does 
not include the right to exclude in his discussion of ownership (Michael A Heller, “The 
Boundaries of Private Property” (1998-1999) 108:6 Yale LJ 1163 at 1213). 
58   See e.g. Ostrom and Hess’s discussion of which property rights adhere to various prop-
erty interests (supra note 3 at 59-63). 
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bundle, the right to exclude is generally considered to be the most im-
portant right and represents the core of ownership.59  
 Recent scholarship has started to inch away from the idea that the 
right to exclude is the sine qua non of property rights60 but, as yet, no one 
has seriously critiqued the emphasis placed on some form of exclusion or 
exclusivity. Shyamkrishna Balganesh has argued that the right to exclude 
is best understood as a duty that non-owners impose on themselves,61 
which places less emphasis on the individual’s ability to effectively ex-
clude others,62 though he continues to argue that exclusion is central to 
property. While Larissa Katz has maintained that property ownership is 
exclusive, she argues that what is exclusive about ownership is the special 
position of owners to set the agenda for the resource, rather than the 
physical exclusion implied by the right to exclude.63 Katz’s focus on defin-
ing ownership also obscures how property rights can attach to non-
owners. If applied to common property, Katz’s definition would result in 
ownership vesting in the government because it “sets the agenda” for how 
such property is used.64 
 As J.E. Penner pointed out in his critique of the bundle of rights theo-
ry, Tony Honoré’s essay on ownership was the first to provide substance 
to the bundle of rights theory.65 Honoré’s discussion of ownership unified 
the bundle of rights in the owner but he recognized the possibility of divi-
sion and that non-owners can and do have property rights.66 Honoré’s fo-
cus on ownership did, however, ignore the possibility that, under the bun-
dle of rights theory, an item could be considered property and give rise to 
property rights without there being an identifiable owner other than that 
of the state. As such, the bundle of rights theory has, in some discussions 
of it, collapsed into a description of ownership, and thus property rights 
                                                  
59   Merrill, supra note 5 at 730, 745-52. 
60   The language of sine qua non was used in Merrill, (ibid at 730); see also Jane B Baron, 
“The Contested Commitments of Property” (2010) 61:4 Hastings LJ 917 at 919. 
61   Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolabil-
ity, and Automatic Injunctions” (2008) 31:2 Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 593 at 612, 619. 
62   For a discussion of self-help and property see Henry E Smith, “Self-Help and the Na-
ture of Property” (2005) 1:1 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy 69. 
63   Katz, “Exclusion and Exclusivity”, supra note 5 at 276-78. Similar ideas are seen in Eric 
Claeys’ work (see Eric R Claeys, “Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?”, Book 
Review of Property: Principles and Policies by Thomas W Merrill & Henry E Smith 
(2009) 32:3 Seattle UL Rev 617 at 631-34). 
64   AWB Simpson argues that the idea of government “ownership” is actually quite modern 
(A History of the Land Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at 47). 
65   Penner, supra note 4 at 731. 
66   Honoré, supra note 4 at 176. 
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appear individualistic instead of relational67 and emphasize the rights of 
owners above all else. Although Ostrom and Hess apply the bundle of 
rights theory to instances of commonly owned resources,68 legal academics 
have tended to limit the application of the theory to private property own-
ership. 
 Penner criticized the bundle of rights theory because of its inability to 
do more than elaborate on “the scope of action that ownership provides,”69 
or as Eric Claeys put it, “a right to exclude from the thing merely states a 
particular outcome.”70 That is, of course, precisely the point. Henry Smith 
and Thomas Merrill praise the bundle of rights theory, in particular the 
right to exclude, because it efficiently identifies the owner and gives him 
control over his property at little cost to others.71 The current understand-
ing of the bundle of rights theory thus envisages property as something 
that is capable of being bounded as far as possible. The right to exclude, 
for example, implies that a person has a bounded thing over which he or 
she is entirely sovereign.72 The exclusive and exclusionary rights that a 
person has over this bounded thing, which is theoretically separate from 
all other things, is supposed to protect and promote certain other rights of 
citizens and act as a bulwark against government interference. 73 The idea 
of individual power, free from all other constraints over a bounded thing, 
                                                  
67   For more on the idea that legal entitlements are relational see generally, Wesley New-
comb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning and 
Other Legal Essays (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923). 
68   Ostrom & Hess, supra note 3 at 59-63. 
69   Penner, supra note 4 at 741. 
70   Claeys, supra note 63 at 633-34. Compare with Mossoff’s critique of both the bundle of 
rights theory and the right to exclude because both fail to produce “a concept of property 
that can serve as a viable, substantive foundation for our property doctrines” (Adam 
Mossoff, “What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together” (2003) 45:2 Ariz L Rev 
371 at 376). 
71   Merrill & Smith, supra note 4 at 387-89. 
72   This idea of the exclusionary right as being like sovereignty can be seen in Katz’s for-
mulation of ownership as agenda-setting: “[j]ust as a sovereign governs a territory 
without making all decisions that concern it, so the fate of a thing is not solely a func-
tion of an owner’s decisions” (Katz, “Exclusion and Exclusivity”, supra note 5 at 294; see 
also ibid at 277-78, 293-95). See also Morris Cohen, “Property and Sovereignty” in Mac-
pherson, supra note 13 at 155. 
73   For a critique of this, see Rose, “Keystone”, supra note 23. Larissa Katz has recently ar-
gued that formal private property rights are not always the best way to defend against 
government intrusion because they can breed dependence. Katz, however, goes on to 
argue that “informal” private property rights, such as neighbours settling disputes 
amongst themselves without recourse to the state, can actually do a better job of pro-
tecting the individual against the state, (Larissa Katz, “‘Governing through Owners’: 
How and Why Formal Private Property Rights Enhance State Power” (2012) 160:7 U 
Pa L Rev 2029). 
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is much easier to understand than the reality of exceptions, limits, and 
burdens inherent in property rights.74 In this way, the current under-
standing of the bundle of rights theory overemphasizes the role of the in-
dividual in creating and enforcing property rights at the expense of recog-
nizing their inherently relational nature. 
 Thus, the current dominant theory of property is more a definition of 
ownership than an explanation of property. The focus on ownership 
means that any analysis of property must begin with the owner and his or 
her use of the property. This focus poses particular problems for common 
property as ownership is either shared equally among the population—
which would make it next to impossible to deduce the owners’ agenda—or 
vested in the government. The latter understanding of the ownership of 
common property would still cause problems under the bundle of rights 
theory because the theory does not recognize the potential for outside in-
fluences on the owner or the property. Consequently, under the bundle of 
rights theory, property often appears divorced from its social context be-
cause the theory defers to the owner’s control of his property and only re-
luctantly examines any other relationships.75 A more nuanced under-
standing of common property is further hindered by legal academics’ reli-
ance on the conventional categories of property, which views individual 
private property as the base-line model from which all other forms of 
property emerge. As a result property’s inherently social nature appears 
as an aberration that must be qualified and limited. It does not have to be 
this way, however, because Macpherson relies on the bundle of rights the-
ory without collapsing it into a description of ownership.76 In addition to 
this Ostrom and Hess use the bundle of rights theory to describe how 
rights are shared in commonly held resources and are able to differentiate 
between rights of ownership and rights of access to such resources.77 
 Despite the alternate visions of property offered by Macpherson, and 
Ostrom and Hess, the academic focus on how to explain ownership of pri-
vate property has left Canadian courts without the tools needed to under-
stand common property on its own terms. As I now move on to show, the 
                                                  
74   Bruce A Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1977) at 97-100; Jonathan Remy Nash, “Packaging Property: The Effect of Para-
digmatic Framing of Property Rights” (2009) 83:3 Tul L Rev 691 at 692. Law and eco-
nomics theory also claims that a bounded thing has fewer information costs, Merrill & 
Smith, supra note 4 at 383-89. 
75   See for example Smith’s distinction between trespass and nuisance, Henry E Smith, 
“Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights” (2002) 
31:2 J Legal Stud S453 at S455. 
76   Macpherson, supra note 13 at 3. 
77   Ostrom & Hess, supra note 3 at 59-63. 
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recent case of Batty provides an excellent example of just how much Ca-
nadian courts struggle with the idea of common property. 
II. Batty: Parks, Protesters, and Private Property 
 Batty ought to have been a simple case. The case arose out of a Tres-
pass Notice issued by the City of Toronto under the Trespass to Property 
Act78 to Occupy Toronto, which had been protesting in St. James Park 
continuously for several weeks.79 Occupy Toronto challenged the Trespass 
Notice on the grounds that it violated the protesters’ sections 2(a) to (d) 
Charter rights.80 While their challenge ultimately failed, the court en-
gaged in an unnecessarily lengthy and meandering decision that failed to 
deliver its promised discussion of “How do we share common space?”81 
 Although certain aspects of Batty were novel, neither tent cities, nor 
quasi-permanent structures erected as part of a protest were unknown to 
Canadian jurisprudence.82 In fact, two British Columbian cases, one deal-
ing with a tent city and the other dealing with the right of protesters to 
erect a structure, were decided in 2009 and 2010 respectively.83 Before I 
compare Batty with the existing jurisprudence, it is necessary to examine 
what the court had to say about Occupy Toronto and its right to use St. 
James Park.  
 The park at issue in Batty is located in downtown Toronto, within 
walking distance of Bay Street, Canada’s financial centre. The park is 
mostly grass and pathways, although it also contains a smaller ornamen-
tal garden, a large gazebo, a handful of benches, and numerous “mature 
trees”. According to Richad Ubbens, Toronto’s Director of Parks, St. 
James Park is a “lovely urban oasis” and a restful place in an otherwise 
densely built-up area.84 Due to the park’s proximity to Bay Street, Occupy 
Toronto chose it as the site for their protest, echoing Occupy Wall Street’s  
                                                  
78   RSO 1990, c T21. 
79   Batty, supra note 1 at paras 3-4. 
80   Ibid at para 6. 
81   Ibid at para 1. 
82   Victoria (City of) v Adams, 2009 BCCA 563, 313 DLR (4th) 29, [Adams]; Weisfeld v 
Canada, [1995] 1 FCR 68 (available on QL); Vancouver (City of) v Zhang, 2010 BCCA 
450, 325 DLR (4th) 313, [Zhang]. 
83   Adams, supra note 82; Zhang, supra note 82. 
84   Ibid at paras 24-26 
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occupation of Zuccotti Park in New York City.85 Occupy Toronto erected 
numerous tents and other structures in St James Park and proceeded to 
live in, or “occupy”, the park for four weeks until the City of Toronto be-
gan the process of eviction. According to Ubbens’ affidavit, there were al-
most two hundred structures in St. James Park, the majority of which 
were tents, though there were also two yurts, a tree house, and several 
port-o-lets.86 The nature of Occupy Toronto’s use of St. James Park was such 
that other Torontonians could not freely access the park as they once had. 
 While Batty did offer some discussion of how Toronto and Torontoni-
ans used St. James Park, the court also examined the impact of Occupy 
Toronto on surrounding and adjacent properties. At first, this seems like a 
bold move for property law, given its resistance to explicit recognition of 
property’s inherently overlapping and interconnected nature.87 Based, 
however, on Occupy Toronto’s clear and legally unjustified de facto appro-
priation of common property, there was no need to refer to the protest’s 
impact on adjacent properties. That the court should do so is indicative of 
the weakness of common property and the dominance of private property 
in Canadian jurisprudence. 
 The local residents’ affidavits depicted Occupy Toronto as a nuisance, 
though that term was not explicitly mentioned. The residents complained 
that the protestors’ encampment was noisy and smelly. Excessive noise 
and unpleasant smells are two classic examples of nuisance due to the dif-
ficulty of containing them to the area where they originate.88 In Batty, the 
residents also described Occupy Toronto as being threatening, and men-
tion how they were avoiding the areas closest to the park. Thus, the dis-
ruption caused by Occupy Toronto was not limited to the park, as the pro-
testers claimed it was.  
 The appearance of the local residents in the decision adds another el-
ement of balancing into the case, which echoes Joseph Singer’s proposed 
social relations model of property. Singer’s social relations model centred 
on nuisance with the hope that this would force courts to balance private 
property rights with the effects of these rights’ exercise “on other property 
                                                  
85   Ibid at para 27; see Mattahias Schwartz, “Map: How Occupy Wall Street Chose Zuccotti 
Park” The New Yorker (21 November 2011), online: The New Yorker <http://www. 
newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/11/occupy-wall-street-map.html>. 
86   Batty, supra note 1 at para 29. 
87   See Craig Anthony Arnold, “The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Inter-
ests” (2002) 26:2 Harv Envtl L Rev 281 at 282, 332-33; see also Nestor M Davidson & 
Rashmi Dyal-Chand, “Property in Crisis” (2010) 78:4 Fordham L Rev 1607 at 1638. 
88   Batty, supra note 1 at para 42. For a definition and discussion of nuisance see, Henry E 
Smith, “Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance” (2004) 90:4 Va L Rev 
965 at 996-1004 [Smith, “Exclusion”]. 
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owners and on the public at large.”89 In Batty, Occupy Toronto’s use of St. 
James Park was balanced in exactly this way. The judgment in Batty 
opens with the recognition that all rights have to be balanced with each 
other and that no rights are absolute because they are limited both by 
others’ rights and the law.90 This statement alone would have been 
enough to justify the court’s decision to uphold Toronto’s order to remove 
the Occupy encampment for, as already mentioned, the movement failed 
to respect others’ common property rights. The appearance of local resi-
dents in the judgment, however, results in the court balancing the impact 
of Occupy Toronto on adjacent properties as well. 
 Yet, Singer’s social relations model was suggested solely in the context 
of private property rights, not common property rights. In the article 
where he first discussed the social relations model, Singer was concerned 
with how to ensure public accommodation to private properties like shops 
or hotels.91 While it is true that common property such as parks necessari-
ly overlaps with and is interdependent on the property that surrounds it, 
there was no explicit nuisance complaint in Batty. Therefore, the park 
ought to have been examined in isolation. The effect of importing a social 
relations model of property into Batty is that those people with private 
property rights adjacent to the park are considered twice: first, as mem-
bers of the public excluded from the park by Occupy Toronto, and second, 
because of their proximity to the park. The views and rights of private 
property owners were, consequently, amplified. As desirable as it might 
be for courts to perform a relational analysis of property, in the context of 
common property such an analysis can overemphasize the rights of adja-
cent private property owners at the expense of common property rights. 
Everyone has an equal right not to be excluded from common property; 
yet, Batty’s focus on adjacent property rights gave those with adjacent 
property rights extra rights in the park and thus added an element of ine-
quality to the analysis. 
 The legal issue in Batty¸ however, was the application of trespass leg-
islation rather than an allegation of nuisance. Had it been the latter, the 
court would have been entitled to examine the impact of Occupy Toronto 
on surrounding properties. The question over the constitutionality of To-
ronto’s Trespass Notice ought to have kept the court focused on the issue 
of how Occupy Toronto used the park, whether this was in keeping with 
Toronto’s by-laws governing the use of municipal parks, and whether 
these by-laws infringed the Charter. As Occupy Toronto protesters effec-
                                                  
89   Singer, “No Right to Exclude”, supra note 54 at 1464. 
90   Batty, supra note 1 at paras 1-2, 13-15. 
91   Ibid at 1286-302. 
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tively appropriated the park and prevented others from using it, they vio-
lated the common property rights of others. Consequently, the Trespass 
Notice formed a reasonable attempt by the city to regulate its property ac-
cording to the limits imposed by the Charter and by the need to keep 
parks available for all.92 At no point did Toronto attempt to ban Occupy 
Toronto from St. James Park. The city did, however, attempt to persuade 
the protesters to only use the park during the appointed hours.93 As To-
ronto did not seek to impose an “absolute ban” on Occupy Toronto’s ex-
pression, the Trespass Notice was constitutional.94 
 The court’s discussion of what were ultimately irrelevant private 
property interests suggests that the court did not feel that Occupy Toron-
to’s violation of the public’s common property rights was enough of a justi-
fication for the city’s action. The appearance of these irrelevant private 
property rights is even more jarring given that the court eventually con-
cluded that Occupy Toronto would be entitled to protest in the park from 
5:30 a.m. to 12:00 a.m.95 These hours of protest would arguably be just as 
much of a nuisance to local residents and businesses as the twenty-four-
hour protest.96 It is not entirely clear that limiting Occupy Toronto to 
these hours would have changed much for the protesters as, according to 
the decision in Batty, the protest was not particularly active at night and 
many of the protesters did not camp in the park overnight.97 The real 
problem then, despite Justice Brown’s attempt to portray Occupy Toronto 
as a nuisance, was the de facto appropriation of the park and the exclu-
sion of other members of the public from using the park. 
 There are a number of reasons why Batty may have mentioned the af-
fidavits of local residents, but the prevailing reason appears to have been 
the court’s reluctance to rely solely on common property rights. The court 
adopted a three-pronged critique of Occupy Toronto. First, it appropriated 
common property for its own use; second, it failed to comply with Toron-
to’s attempts to regulate its parks; and third, it inconvenienced those with 
adjacent private property rights.98 Of the three main criticisms of Occupy 
Toronto, the second one proved to be the most fully developed. In its role 
of regulator of common property, Toronto appears more like an owner, be-
                                                  
92   Batty, supra note 1 at para 111. 
93   Ibid at para 104. 
94   Ibid at paras 104, 124, 128.  
95   Ibid at paras 5, 75, 123. 
96   Ibid at para 104. 
97   Ibid at paras 30-31. 
98   Ibid at paras 42, 45-48, 108. 
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cause it makes the decisions and sets the agenda for such property.99 Even 
though Toronto only holds such property for the benefit of the public, it 
has a large degree of discretion over the appropriate use of this proper-
ty.100 Traditionally, the analogy of common property has been that of the 
trust, but Batty seems to adopt the analogy of government as owner. The 
differences between the two analogies are subtle, but the trust analogy of 
common property emphasizes that such property is held for the benefit of 
the public, while the ownership analogy emphasizes how the government 
uses the property.101 Although the public appeared in Batty, the court paid 
much more attention to the appropriateness of Toronto’s regulation and 
failed to discuss what rights exist in common property and how they op-
erate. 
 The reason Toronto’s regulation of its parks appears more like the ac-
tion of a private property owner than that of a public body is due to how 
Batty understands Toronto’s regulation. Justice Brown argued that, with-
out the city’s careful balancing act, “chaos would reign; parks would be-
come battlegrounds of competing uses,” or that “parks would become plac-
es where the stronger, by use of occupation and intimidation, could ex-
clude the weaker.”102 In short, Justice Brown adopted the Hobbesian un-
derstanding of the state of nature and combined it with the tragedy of the 
commons to describe Toronto’s regulation as a civilizing force and one 
which ensures efficient use. 103 Justice Brown’s understanding has clear 
echoes with the traditional common law ideas about private property’s 
ability to civilize and to ensure efficient use.104 While it is true that many 
municipal parks emerged out of a late-nineteenth-century attempt to 
shape the population towards a desired ideal,105 it is also clear that Justice 
Brown confuses common property with non-property or open access prop-
                                                  
99   Larissa Katz argues that the agenda-setting right is the key ownership right (“Exclu-
sion and Exclusivity”, supra note 5). 
100  For a discussion of how St. James Park was used, see Batty, supra note 1 at para 25. 
101  See infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text. 
102  Batty, supra note 1 at para 91. 
103  For Hobbes’ understanding of the state of nature see Sturm, supra note 17 at 370-71. 
For the tragedy of the commons, see Garett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons” 
(1968) 162 Science 1243. Brown J explicitly references the “tragedy of the commons” in 
Batty, supra note 1 at para 113. 
104  For more on the belief in the civilising potential of individual private property see 
Sturm, supra note 18 at 355-60; Gregory S Alexander, “Time and Property in the Amer-
ican Republican Legal Culture” (1991) 66:2 NYUL Rev 273 at 286-87, 332; John Brewer 
& Susan Staves, “Introduction” in John Brewer & Susan Staves, eds, Early Modern 
Conceptions of Property (New York: Routledge, 1995) 1 at 1. 
105  Lehavi, supra note 27 at 177. 
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erty.106 Common property, like all forms of property, only exists because of 
state recognition and regulation. If Batty had taken common property se-
riously, the emphasis would have been on the benefit that the public ac-
tually receives from common property such as parks, rather than the al-
leged harm that Toronto’s regulation prevented.107 
 Had Batty relied on the trust analogy, the court’s analysis would have 
emphasized the public’s right not to be excluded above all else. While it is 
true that the government as owner analogy still leaves room for that 
property to be held in the public interest, the public interest appears as a 
burden on the property rather than a defining feature of the property as it 
is under the trust analogy of common property. Thus the government-as-
owner analogy assumes that private property is the baseline model of 
property, and attempts to force it into a private property model as far as 
possible. In Batty, the court’s reliance on the government-as-owner analo-
gy, which understands common property as a variant of private property, 
forced the court to paint the Occupy movement as a nuisance rather than 
just relying on the public’s right not to be excluded. Had the court used 
the trust analogy, there would have been no need to refer to the impact of 
Occupy Toronto on surrounding properties because the court would have 
focused on Toronto’s need to make and keep its parks open to all. Under 
the trust analogy, the court would have emphasized the benefit the public 
receives from parks like St. James Park.108 The trust analogy would not 
have given any member of the public standing to challenge how Toronto 
managed its property,109 but it would have focused the court’s attention on 
the public’s right to access and use the park.110 The court would have em-
phasized that Toronto’s attempt to regulate public parks aimed to ensure 
                                                  
106  See supra notes 16-44 for definitions of these kinds of property. 
107  On several occasions the decision in Batty references anarchy, chaos, and the need to 
obey the law; such comments appear as an implicit critique of Occupy Toronto and its 
methods, see e.g. Batty, supra note 1 at para 91. A full examination of this aspect of 
Batty is beyond the scope of this article. 
108  It should be noted that the trust analogy does not actually create a trust, and much like 
the public trust doctrine in the US, traditional trust law does not apply. There is, thus, 
no need to discuss the identity of the settler, trustee, and beneficiary in cases of public 
trusts. 
109  Unless, of course, any individual could show that she “suffered damages of a special 
character” as a result of the government’s regulation of public-common property (see 
Hunt, supra note 8 at 166). 
110  Although some academics have called for Canada to adopt the American public trust 
doctrine, two recent court cases suggest that the Canadian judiciary would be deeply re-
luctant to do so without express legislative provisions: British Columbia v Canadian 
Forest Products Ltd, 2004 SCC 38 at paras 80-83, [2004] 2 SCR 74, [Canadian Forest]; 
Burns Bog Conservation Society v Canada (AG), 2012 FC 1024 at paras 39, 107 (availa-
ble on CanLII) [Burns Bog]. 
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that the public would not be excluded from these parks, rather than focus-
ing on the impact that the use of common property has on adjacent pri-
vate property. As Occupy Toronto quite clearly appropriated an entire city 
park, and thus, excluded the public, there was no need to paint the pro-
test as a nuisance as well. 
 Although Batty does reference the fact that Occupy Toronto effectively 
appropriated the entire park, Justice Brown also repeatedly refers to To-
ronto’s need to respect the private property rights of those adjacent to the 
park.111 Therefore, not only must Toronto take into account the public’s 
right not to be excluded from municipal parks, it must also be respectful 
of the private property rights of those adjacent to public parks. Such a 
stance would make little sense under the trust analogy of common proper-
ty, because under that analogy such property is held for the benefit of the 
public not the benefit of adjacent private property rights holders. As de-
sirable as it might be to recognize the relational aspects of property, they 
should not be recognized at the expense of everyone’s right to use instanc-
es of common property, or more importantly, at the expense of fundamen-
tal human rights such as free expression. Nor should the relational as-
pects of property only apply to common property. Justice Brown’s refer-
ence to Toronto’s need to respect adjacent private property rights appears 
to echo the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property 
in such a way that you do not damage others’ property), though Justice 
Brown fails to mention that this maxim applies to all forms of property, 
not just common. Ironically, Batty’s deference to the private property 
rights of those adjacent to St. James Park does the very thing that Occupy 
Toronto was accused of doing: it seems to create private rights to public 
property.112 
 The appearance of private property owners in Batty is in contrast to 
two recent cases dealing with similar situations. Just two years before the 
decision in Batty, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia delivered its 
judgment in Victoria (City) v. Adams, a case which arose out of a tent city 
in one of Victoria’s parks. Adams differed from Batty in that the court fo-
cused on whether or not Victoria’s by-law prohibiting overhead shelter 
during the night in public parks violated section 7 of the Charter. At both 
                                                  
111  For references to Occupy Toronto’s appropriation see Batty, supra note 1 at paras 12, 
15, 42-49, 70, 91, 97, 108-09. For references to adjacent properties, see ibid at paras 42, 
44, 92, 97, 112. 
112  Mariana Valverde argues that certain features of urban governance such as noise codes 
and zoning laws grant more protections to certain socio-economic groups than to others 
(“Seeing Like a City: The Dialectic of Modern and Premodern Ways of Seeing in Urban 
Governance” (2011) 45:2 Law & Soc’y Rev 277 at 286, 295). Arguably this could also 
lead to a similar private appropriation of public property. 
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trial and appeal, the by-law was found to violate the right to life because 
Victoria lacked enough overnight shelters for its homeless population.113 
Adams, however, also dealt with the same common property issues that 
arose in Batty, namely that such overhead shelter acted as an appropria-
tion of common property for private use. At no stage in Adams did the 
court refer to the impact that any such shelter would have on adjacent 
private property. A year after Adams, the Court of Appeal for British Co-
lumbia issued its judgment in Zhang, which dealt with a semi-permanent 
shelter erected by the Falun Gong outside Vancouver’s Chinese Consu-
late.114 The court found Vancouver’s by-law prohibiting the erection of 
structures on public streets to violate the Charter because it lacked an ex-
plicit political exception. As in Adams, the court made reference to the 
need to balance the competing rights and usage of property such as 
streets and parks. The impact of Falun Gong’s shelter on adjacent proper-
ties was ignored, even though the Chinese Consulate had complained 
about it.115 
 Both Zhang and Adams challenged municipal by-laws while Batty 
sought to challenge the Trespass Notice issued by Toronto under the 
Trespass to Property Act. The difference might appear subtle, but it re-
sults in Batty’s property issues taking on greater importance. In most 
common law provinces, trespass legislation codifies and enhances the 
common law protections against trespass to property. As noted by the 
courts, such legislation increases the power of private property owners.116 
In particular, it grants private property owners the power to declare a be-
haviour trespass. In short, the trespass legislation grants property owners 
the right to control who can access their property and what they can do 
there.117 The result is that not only does Batty defer to adjacent private 
property rights, it also defers to the city’s use of the park over and above 
the public’s use of the park. 
 The deference to the city as regulator was also seen in the judgement 
of the Court of Appeal in Adams. Unlike the trial court, the Court of Ap-
                                                  
113  Adams, supra note 82 at paras 1, 166. Overhead shelters during the day remain prohib-
ited, see Johnston v Victoria (City of), 2011 BCCA 400 at paras 6, 7, 16, 22 BCLR (5th) 
269. 
114  Zhang, supra note 82 at para 1. 
115  Ibid at paras 26-27. 
116  R v Asante-Mensah, 2003 SCC 38 at para 25, [2003] 2 SCR 3, [Asante-Mensah]; R v SA, 
2011 ABPC 269 at paras 65-66, 242 CRR (2d) 26, rev'd 2012 ABQB 311, 97 MPLR (4th) 
217 [SA (ABPC)] [SA (ABQB)], leave of appeal granted 2012 ABCA 323 (available on 
CanLII). 
117  Trespass Act, RSBC 1996, c 462, s 4(1)(c); Trespass to Property Act, supra note 100 at ss 
(2)(a)(ii), 4(1). 
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peal did not offer any serious analysis of common property rights and ap-
peared to assume that the only limitation on how Victoria regulated its 
property was the Charter.118 In fact, the Court of Appeal refused to con-
sider a temporary right to use the park as any kind of property right.119 
Zhang saw the same court reiterate the need to regulate city streets;120 
however, in its discussion of city streets, the court emphasized their role 
in both circulation and free expression, rather than the public’s right not 
to be excluded from them. Such failures to properly engage with common 
property rights are hardly surprising given the existing jurisprudence 
from the Supreme Court of Canada, which strongly suggests a shift from 
the trust analogy of common property to the government as owner analogy.  
III. The Rise of the Government-as-Owner 
 The emergence of the government-as-owner analogy of common prop-
erty echoes developments in the jurisprudence on private property. The 
latter jurisprudence also defers to the owner of the property rather than 
attempting to situate the property in the context of how others see it and 
use it. Canadian courts, for example, still do not recognize the possibility 
of public forums existing on private property. This is in contrast to some 
American jurisprudence which holds that, because malls and shopping 
centres fulfill the function of public markets, they are considered public 
forums and thus owners cannot prohibit some forms of free expression.121 
Similar jurisprudence from Canada defers to the owner’s use and control 
of the shopping centre in question, which necessarily simplifies how such 
property is understood, and grants a significant amount of power to the 
owners of private property. In this section I explore how Canadian courts 
treat common property and, where relevant, I compare it with how the 
courts treat publicly accessible, yet privately owned property. 
                                                  
118  Adams, supra note 82 at paras 98-101. 
119  Ibid at para 100. 
120  Zhang, supra note 82 at para 50. 
121  Harrison v Carswell, [1976] 2 SCR 200 at 210-12, 62 DLR (3d) 68, Laskin CJC [Harri-
son] citing to Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp v Bakery & Confectionery Workers 
Union Local 31 61 Cal 2d 766, 394 P 2d 921 (Cal S Ct 1964); Food Employees v Logan 
Valley Plaza 391 US 308 at 319-25 (US S Ct 1968); Amalgamated Clothing Workers of 
America v Wonderland Shopping Center 370 Mich 547, 122 NW 2d 783 (Mich S Ct 
1963); Lloyd Corp Ltd v Tanner 407 US 551 (US S Ct 1972) (holding that because the 
hand billing at issue had no connection to activity within the mall it was not protected 
under the First Amendment). Subsequent to Laskin CJC’s reference to similar Ameri-
can jurisprudence in Harrison, American courts restricted access to malls. For a discus-
sion of this development see, Timothy Zick, “Property, Place, and Public Discourse” 
(2006) 21 Wash UJL & Pol’y 173 at 181-82. See also Singer, “No Right to Exclude”, su-
pra note 54 at 1412, n 42-43 and accompanying text. 
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 The leading case on the issue of public access to private property re-
mains the pre-Charter decision of Harrison v. Carswell.122 This case dealt 
with whether or not employees engaged in a lawful strike could picket on 
the private sidewalk of a privately owned shopping centre. Despite the 
fact that the owner of the shopping centre openly invited members of the 
public onto his property, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the 
owner could prohibit picketing on his property and that the striking em-
ployees’ convictions for trespass were valid.123 
 Moe Litman argues that Harrison would no longer be considered good 
law, but recent comments from the Supreme Court of Canada suggest 
otherwise.124 Litman’s argument that Harrison is out of date rests on the 
decision in Cadillac Fairview Corporation Limited v. Retail, Wholesale 
and Department Store Union, which centred on labour law rather than 
property law.125 In this case, Ontario’s labour legislation created a specific 
exemption from the effects of Harrison, which suggests that Harrison 
would have otherwise been followed. In contrast to Litman’s claim, Jim 
Phillips and Phil Girard argue that Cadillac Fairview took place in such a 
different context that it does not act as a limit to the decision in Harri-
son.126 Litman, however, also claimed that invoking a Trespass Notice un-
der trespass legislation would be enough to meet the demands of state ac-
tion required by the Charter.127 Litman’s argument was made almost two 
decades ago and, since then, comments from the Supreme Court, particu-
larly the McLachlin Court, suggest that Harrison is still good law.128 In 
Québec Inc, for example, the Court commented that “[p]rivate property ... 
will fall outside the protected sphere of s. 2(b) absent state-imposed limits 
on expression, since state action is necessary to implicate the Canadian 
                                                  
122  For an in-depth history of this case see Philip Girard & Jim Phillips, “A Certain ‘Mal-
laise’: Harrison v. Carswell, Shopping Centre Picketing, and the Limits of the Post-war 
Settlement” in Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, eds, Work on Trial: Canadian Labour Law 
Struggles (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History by Irwin Law, 2010) 
249. 
123  Harrison, supra note 121 at 219. 
124  MM Litman, “Freedom of Speech and Private Property: The Case of the Mall Owner” in 
David Schneiderman, ed, Freedom of Expression and the Charter (Calgary: Thomson, 
1991) 361 at 399. 
125  Cadillac Fairview Corp Ltd v Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, 71 OR 
(2d) 206 (available on CanLII). 
126  Girard & Phillips, supra note 122 at 271. 
127  Litman, supra note 124 at 401-02. 
128  This was the case before Litman wrote his article, see RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, 
[1986] 2 SCR 573 at para 33, 33 DLR (4th) 174. See also Girard & Phillips, supra note 
122 at 272 (“[Harrison] remains a potent precedent”). For pre-Charter decisions, see in-
fra notes 152-58 and accompanying text. 
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Charter.”129 This comment seems to suggest that the Supreme Court 
would be unwilling to adopt Litman’s argument that a Trespass Notice 
constitutes state action unless the notice is issued in respect of govern-
ment property. In addition, R. v. Asante-Mensah saw the Supreme Court 
comment that Trespass Notices could be applied in the context of protest-
ers on private property. While the Court noted that this was a powerful 
weapon, it was one granted by the legislature, which suggests a reluc-
tance to interfere with it without further legislative direction.130 
 The starting point for a post-Charter analysis of common property is 
Commonwealth of Canada. Although this case focused on the issue of free 
expression, the location of the contested expression—the public hall of 
Montreal’s Dorval airport—resulted in the Supreme Court providing a re-
vealing commentary on property. In this case, the government attempted 
to argue that it had all the same rights as a private property owner and 
could, thus, prohibit expressive activity from the airport, but the Supreme 
Court disagreed. In doing so, the Court necessarily discussed the nature 
of government-owned property; in particular, it focused on what rights as 
owner, if any, the government had in respect of instances of common 
property. 
 Prior to Commonwealth of Canada, the trust analogy of common prop-
erty appeared to be the dominant paradigm of common property in Cana-
da, as in other common law countries.131 The trust analogy is generally 
considered to have its origins in ancient Roman law and was later adopted 
into the early English common law. Traditionally, the trust analogy 
granted the public the rights of navigation, commerce, and fishing in tidal 
waters. The trust analogy also granted access to highways and certain 
parts of the coast. Under the English common law, these rights remained 
relatively narrow and the English courts never explicitly described the 
public’s rights to such property as being a “public trust”.132 Canada copied 
the narrow and limited nature of the trust analogy, though as Smallwood 
notes, Canadian recognition of the public’s rights of navigation and fish-
ing was “fairly short-lived” and underdeveloped.133 Smallwood argues that 
                                                  
129  Montreal (City) v 2952-1366 Québec Inc, 2005 SCC 62 at para 62, [2005] 3 SCR 141 
[Québec Inc]. 
130  Asante-Mensah, supra note 116 at paras 26-28. 
131  Smallwood, supra note 8 at 10, 12-61; Hunt, supra note 8 at 152-56. 
132  von Tigerstrom, supra note 8 at 381; Smallwood, supra note 8 at 10. 
133  Smallwood, supra note 8 at 77-103. Three years after Smallwood wrote her thesis, how-
ever, the Supreme Court issued a number of decisions about aboriginal fishing rights 
that also referred to the public’s common law right to fish (see e.g. R v Gladstone, [1996] 
2 SCR 723 at 770-71, 137 DLR (4th) 648 [Gladstone]). For an in-depth critique of Glad-
stone and the other fishing rights cases, see Mark D Walters, “Aboriginal Rights, 
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Canadian recognition of the public’s right to highways was stronger, but 
remained limited in scope.134 In the United States, however, the trust 
analogy developed into the public trust doctrine and has proven to be a 
powerful tool for protecting the environment.135 
 Though the trust analogy never became as powerful in Canada as it is 
in the United States, in Commonwealth of Canada, Chief Justice Lamer 
quoted from an American case, Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organ-
ization, in order to describe common property: 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use 
of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part 
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. Th[is] 
privilege … may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, 
but relative, … but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be 
abridged or denied.136 
This definition echoes the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in the1932 
case of Burchill. In Burchill, Justice Rinfret may have said that “munici-
palities are in a sense owners of the streets,” but he was quick to qualify 
this by noting that municipal property was nothing like private property 
and that municipalities “[hold] [their streets] as trustee for the public.”137 
Thus under the trust analogy, governments are only “owners” of property 
in the sense that trustees are owners of trust property. To put it another 
way, the trust analogy understands the government as holding property 
for the benefit of the public and does not grant the government the same 
extensive ownership rights as found under private property. 
 In Commonwealth of Canada, the appearance of the trust analogy is 
particularly notable given the exact nature of the common property at is-
sue. Traditionally the trust analogy only applied to assets such as high-
ways, tidal waters, and certain fishing grounds. Yet in Commonwealth of 
Canada, Chief Justice Lamer used section 2(b) of the Charter to extend 
      
Magna Carta, and Exclusive Rights to Fisheries in the Waters of Upper Canada” (1998) 
23:2 Queen’s LJ 301. 
134  Smallwood, supra note 8 at 93-100. 
135  Hunt, supra note 8 at 156-61. See also Ziff, supra note 4 at 228. 
136  307 US 496 (1939) at 515-16, 59 S Ct 954 cited by Lamer CJ in Commonwealth, supra 
note 11 at para 14. Compare with Simpson, supra note 64 at 47 (“[t]he lawyers never 
adopted the premise that the King owned all the land; such a dogma is of very modern 
appearance”). See also the history of this idea in the English common law in Smallwood, 
supra note 8 at 19-42. 
137  Burchill, supra note 10 at 625. 
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the trust analogy to the public area of an airport terminal and extended 
the public’s right of access so that it includes communicative purposes.138 
According to Chief Justice Lamer, then, the Charter enhances the public’s 
right of access to include buildings provided such buildings are analogous 
to parks or other public meeting places, and provided such buildings are 
“owned” by the government. Though the Chief Justice’s discussion of the 
trust analogy seemed largely ignorant of the earlier Canadian jurispru-
dence on the issue,139 he accepted that the analogy applied in Canada and 
that it had a long history. 
 Despite the long history of the trust analogy of common property, 
Commonwealth of Canada introduced another way to understand such 
property. While Chief Justice Lamer and Justice Sopinka rejected the 
government’s claim to have the same rights as a private property owner 
and adhered to the trust analogy of common property,140 the judgements 
of Justices McLachlin and La Forest effectively introduced the govern-
ment-as-owner analogy.141 Justice McLachlin (as she then was) attempted 
to differentiate between private government property and public govern-
ment property.142 While this attempt appears to recognize the complexity 
of property, its application results in an oversimplification. Rather than 
examine whether or not there are other forums available for free expres-
sion, Justice McLachlin only paid attention to the government’s use of its 
property and effectively deferred to the government as owner.143 The idea 
that the government only holds property for the benefit of the public van-
ished in Justice McLachlin’s categories of government property and, even 
in the case of public government-owned property, the only real limitation 
on the government’s use is the Charter. As Chief Justice of Canada, 
McLachlin has since reiterated her distinction between the forms of gov-
                                                  
138  Criminal Lawyers’ Assn v Ontario (Ministry of Public Safety and Security), 2007 ONCA 
392 at para 39, 280 DLR (4th) 193 (“[in Commonwealth] the issue was whether the pub-
lic had a right to access an airport for the purposes of expressing itself. In that case, 
there was no underlying statutory or common law right to access the location in ques-
tion... [T]he court had to determine whether s. 2(b) ought to warrant a right of access.”) 
[CLA]. 
139  This jurisprudence is discussed in detail in Smallwood, supra note 8 at 77-103. Some-
what surprisingly Smallwood failed to discuss the decision in Commonwealth even 
though it came out before she wrote her thesis. 
140  Commonwealth, supra note 11 at paras 13-14. 
141  Ibid at paras 45, 215. 
142  Ibid at para 215. LaForme JA’s comments in CLA (supra note 138 at para 39) might 
explain McLachlin J’s novel “government as owner” analogy, but they do  not explain 
Lamer CJC and Sopinka J’s continued reliance on the trust analogy. 
143  Richard Moon, “Out of Place: Comment on Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada 
v. Canada” (1993) 38:1 McGill LJ 204 at 224. 
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ernment-owned property and thus this distinction would appear to be 
good law in Canada.144 McLachlin CJC’s distinction has also been echoed 
by lower courts, which further suggests that the government as owner 
analogy of common property has taken over from the trust analogy.145 
 The term “government-owned property” is problematic for a further 
reason because it suggests that the public’s right of access to “public gov-
ernment property” is a burden rather than a defining feature of such 
property. If we return to Macpherson’s categories of state and common 
property we can see that the term “government-owned property” collapses 
common property into state property. Admittedly, the line between state 
and common property is a thin one given the state’s role in creating and 
enforcing common property rights: it often acts like an owner. The real 
difference between the two forms of property lies not in how the state or 
government dictates their use but in the role that each form of property 
has to play. The role of common property is essential to the successful 
functioning of society because it facilitates transport, communication, 
connectivity, and other similar activities. By comparison, state property’s 
role is more crucial to the activities of government, such as national secu-
rity or taxation. McLachlin CJC’s repeated emphasis on the government’s 
use of property ignores the role that it has to play and, like the dominant 
understanding of the bundle of rights theory of property,146 focuses on the 
owner rather than on the complex web of interests that surround most 
pieces of property. The term “government-owned property”, thus, implies 
the state’s private property rights rather than the public’s rights to com-
mon property. 
 A recent case from Alberta highlights how the government-as-owner 
analogy complicates the application of trespass legislation to government-
owned property. In SA, a teenager challenged her ban under the Trespass 
to Premises Act from all property owned by the Edmonton Transit Service 
(ETS) as a violation of her section 7 right to liberty147 The court noted that 
the legislation did not differentiate between different types of property. At 
trial, the court clearly felt that there was a difference between public and 
private property and though the court was willing to concede that the 
government’s right to “manage public property for the benefit of citizens ... 
may, on occasion, require that specific persons be banned from particular 
public premises,” but repeatedly noted that “an absolute right to exclude 
persons from public property is inimical to the very notion of public prop-
                                                  
144  Québec Inc, supra note 129 at para 64. 
145  SA (ABPC), supra note 116 at para 82. 
146  See, supra notes 54-75 and accompanying text. 
147  SA (ABPC), supra note 116 at para 114. 
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erty.”148 Though the Provincial Court of Alberta also noted that the gov-
ernment might have a “fiduciary responsibility to manage public property 
for common good,”149 it mistakenly thought that this concept was a rela-
tively new one and failed to recognize that the trust analogy of common 
property is much older than the government-as-owner analogy. Ultimate-
ly, the court concluded that the Trespass to Premises Act was unconstitu-
tional “to the extent that it purports to apply to public property to which 
the public have a general invitation and right to attend.”150 The Court of 
Queen’s Bench of Alberta disagreed and held that, as a general rule, “the 
Crown has the same rights as individuals ... to hold property and to assert 
rights with respect to it, subject to its obligations under the Charter.”151 
Consequently, the Court of Queen’s Bench found the Trespass to Premises 
Act to be constitutional and that it was the government’s use of the Act 
which had the potential to be unconstitutional.152 This suggests that the 
issue of whether and when trespass legislation will apply to government-
owned property remains uncertain.” 
 Commonwealth of Canada was not the last time that the Supreme 
Court commented on common property: in 2005, the issue appeared again 
in Québec Inc. This case arose when a club in downtown Montreal in-
stalled a loudspeaker in its entrance which broadcast “the music and 
commentary accompanying the show under way inside so that passers-by 
would hear” in violation of the city’s bylaw against such noise.153 The club 
was charged with “producing noise that could be heard outside using 
sound equipment” but contested this charge on the grounds of freedom of 
expression and argued that Montreal exceeded its power by defining an 
activity as a nuisance when it was not.154 The Supreme Court disagreed 
and found Montreal’s bylaw to be constitutional. Despite the expression’s 
origin in private property, the Supreme Court focused its analysis on 
common property. The appearance of common property in Québec Inc. re-
sulted from the fact that the case dealt with nuisance rather than a 
recognition that property is inherently interdependent. 
 In Québec Inc., the Court seemed particularly concerned by noise pol-
lution in Canadian urban centres and the need to protect the “peaceful en-
                                                  
148  Ibid at paras 180, 91. 
149  Ibid at para 90. 
150  Ibid at para 190. 
151  SA (ABQB), supra note 116 at para 80. 
152 Ibid at paras 82-85. 
153  Québec Inc, supra note 129 at para 3. 
154  Ibid at para 4. For an analysis of the operation of nuisance in this case see, Valverde, 
supra note 112 at 304-305. 
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joyment” of streets and other public places.155 While concerned that public 
streets be quiet, the Court also noted that the reduction of noise pollution 
was important for “residents” of the City, a term which implicitly suggests 
individuals with private property rights.156 Had the Court used “citizens of 
the City” or “Montrealers”, for example, the association with private prop-
erty rights would have been avoided. That being said, the Court still felt 
that public streets were appropriate venues for freedom of expression and 
that “[a]mplified emissions of noise from buildings onto a public street 
could further democratic discourse, truth finding and self-fulfillment.”157 
The Court held that street noise did not interfere with the primary func-
tion of streets and, thus, continued to examine the use of government-
owned property rather than the rights at stake.158 
 What these cases show is that Canadian courts have long struggled 
with how to conceptualize common property. The distinction that arose in 
Commonwealth of Canada may have been in response to the fact that the 
expressive activity at issue took place inside a building rather than out on 
the streets, but the Supreme Court has since reiterated the private/public 
government-owned property distinction which suggests it holds for all 
government owned property. Prior to Commonwealth of Canada, Canadi-
an courts appeared to prefer the trust analogy of common property as it 
allowed courts to both identify a body responsible for maintaining the 
property and recognize that such property was held for the benefit of oth-
ers.159 Despite Lamer CJC’s apparent reliance on the trust analogy in his 
judgment in Commonwealth of Canada, the other judgments, particularly 
those of McLachlin and La Forest JJ, preferred the government-as-owner 
analogy.160 
 The government-as-owner analogy has the effect of putting the gov-
ernment in the same position as the shopping centre owner in Harrison 
with one major difference. In cases about the public’s access to or use of 
government-owned property, the government’s action is obviously limited 
by the Charter.161 The Charter, however, only applies if the use of the 
                                                  
155  Québec Inc, supra note 129 at paras 20, 26, 89. 
156  Ibid at para 99. 
157  Ibid at para 68 [emphasis added]. 
158  Ibid at para 67. 
159  See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text. 
 160 Commonwealth, supra note 11 at paras 47 (LaForest J) and 227-41, 264 (McLachlin J). 
161 Even LaForest J, who argued that the government had private property rights was will-
ing to concede this point (Ibid at para 47 (“[a]s a general proposition, the Crown’s pro-
prietary rights are the same as those of a private owner, but in exercising them the 
Crown is subject to the overriding requirements of the Charter”); SA (ABQB), supra 
note 116 at paras 82-85 (referring to the government’s use of trespass legislation). 
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property is consistent with public access. For example, it is unlikely that 
the Adams case would have succeeded had the homeless tried to claim the 
right to sleep in City Hall overnight rather than in a municipal park. Like 
the decision in Harrison, the Canadian jurisprudence on common proper-
ty examines the owner’s use and control rather than the values which 
would be upheld by continuing the contested activity. 
 The government-as-owner analogy, much like the powers granted to 
private property in Canadian law, seeks to isolate property. The focus on 
the owner tends to ignore surrounding property, but more importantly, 
also disregards how others use the property. This isolation is less of a 
problem in cases dealing with private homes, but in cases dealing with 
shopping centres it overlooks the fact that the public may consider such 
property to be akin to a public park or a similar meeting place. In Asante-
Mensah, the Supreme Court noted that trespass notices could be issued 
against teenagers in malls, and hence, the Court’s decision over what 
powers of enforcement trespass legislation granted would have ramifica-
tions beyond the case at bar.162 What the Court failed to discuss is wheth-
er or not the issuance of such trespass notices would be appropriate if the 
teenagers behaved lawfully, and if they had no other suitable meeting 
place. In the case of common property, the isolation inherent in the gov-
ernment-as-owner analogy fails to recognize that common property has an 
important social aspect. The refusal to recognize interests other than that 
of owners isolates property from its social aspects as well as from sur-
rounding properties. It is this former isolation that is arguably the most 
serious because it emphasizes individuals but provides no guidance on 
how individuals are to live together. 
IV. Bringing Back the Public 
 Several property scholars have recognized that the bundle of rights 
theory often ignores the social aspects of property and have proposed solu-
tions.163 These solutions fall short, however, when they are applied to 
common property because their primary aim is to make private property 
fairer. As noble a goal as this might be, it will not do much good if in mak-
ing private property fairer the situation of common property deteriorates 
or fails to improve, particularly when the proposed new models of private 
                                                  
162  Asante-Mensah, supra note 116 at para 24. 
163  Singer, “No Right to Exclude”, supra note 54; Singer, “Democratic Estates”, supra note 
44; Gregory S Alexander, “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” 
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property still leave little room for those with no private property rights. 164 
This section begins by examining some proposed new models of property 
and how they would impact common property and argues that they do not 
provide much of a solution to problems caused by the government-as-
owner analogy. The only way to fix the problems caused by the govern-
ment-as-owner analogy is to find a way to return common property’s em-
phasis to the public and their interest in such property. 
 Singer’s proposed social relations model of property, for example, is 
only effective in instances of private property.165 Arguably, Batty implied a 
reliance on this social relations model of property when it referred to the 
impact that Occupy Toronto had on surrounding properties.166 As dis-
cussed above, when applied to common property, the social relations mod-
el gives private property owners more rights because they get an extra 
say in how such common property is used. While the de facto appearance 
of the social relations model in Batty did bring a section of the public back 
into common property, it was only those members of the public who had 
private property rights adjacent to the park.167 This cannot be seen as an-
ything other than a continued deference to private property rights over 
and above common property rights. Such deference was also implied in 
Québec Inc. with its veiled references to “street noise” and “residents.”168 
 Singer appeared to offer a further solution to property’s problems in a 
more recent article when he called for a more democratic approach to 
property.169 This approach “understands property not merely as an indi-
vidual right but a social system.”170 Thus, the democratic approach to 
property would make the “shape and equality of human relationships” 
crucial to “determining whether a set of property rights can be accepted as 
legitimate in a free and equal society.” While a more democratic approach 
would make the government’s role in property rights more explicit, it is 
doubtful that such an approach could overcome commonly held beliefs 
                                                  
164  For a discussion of how a lack of private property rights affects individuals see e.g. Jane 
B Baron, “Homelessness as a Property Problem” (2004) 36 Urban Lawyer 273 at 278; 
see also Waldron, “Homelessness”, supra note 56 at 296-301. 
165  See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
166  Batty, supra note 1 at para 42. 
167  Ibid; see also supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
168  See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text. 
169  Singer, “Democratic Estates”, supra note 44. 
170  Ibid at 1049. 
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about private property which continue to see it as a bulwark against gov-
ernment power.171 
 Once again Singer’s proposed solution focuses on private property ra-
ther than on common property. Presumably, common property would still 
be essential in the forms of streets and parks, but the more democratic 
approach would not necessarily make common property fundamentally 
different from private property. This approach would, for example, still al-
low Canadian courts to use the government-as-owner analogy. As like all 
owners, their rights would have to be judged based on how they promoted 
freedom and democracy.172 Such a balancing is arguably already done in 
some cases involving common property in Canada, particularly in those 
cases where freedom of expression or the right to life is at stake.173 It is, 
therefore, unclear whether a more democratic approach to property would 
coincide with a robust understanding of common property. 
 Gregory Alexander proposed that private property should include a 
social obligation norm but he too fails to engage with how this would af-
fect common property.174 Alexander’s proposed solution aims at making 
private property fairer through recognition that property rights, like all 
social structures and practices, should encourage human flourishing and 
should focus on the social obligations of property rather than on the rights 
of owners.175 As Alexander recognizes, the major problem with this sug-
gestion is that there is no one conception of what “human flourishing” 
might look like.176 However, it is unclear whether this social obligation 
norm would actually change anything: Alexander claims that the social 
obligation norm is already supported by nuisance jurisprudence and that 
this norm can explain “[v]irtually every environmental regulation, federal, 
state, and local.”177 Such results could also be explained by the isolationist 
maxim that a person should not use her property in a way that harms 
others, which is the most reluctant recognition that property cannot be 
                                                  
171  See e.g. David Fagundes, “Explaining the Persistent Myth of Property Absolutism” in 
Robin Paul Malloy & Michael Diamond, eds, The Public Nature of Private Property 
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completely bounded and generally only defers to other private property 
rights holders.178 
 Alexander’s main focus may have been to show that private property 
rights are inherently social but he fell short and conceded as much: 
[t]he social-obligation theorist would remain constantly mindful of 
the risk that the state may demand more of private owners than it 
legitimately can and that we must limit the sacrifices that society 
asks owners to make in the interest of maintaining a society and a 
polity that nurture human good essential to a well-lived life.179 
Alexander is understandably reluctant to suggest any serious changes to 
private property for fear of being seen as advocating redistribution. Thus, 
Alexander cannot escape the deference to private property rights that he 
envisaged with his social obligation norm. 
 In addition, it is not clear that imposing a social obligation norm on 
government-owned property would change the existing Canadian juris-
prudence. Any imposition of a social obligation norm on government-
owned property would, of course, escape the accusations of government 
interference that would happen if the norm was imposed on private prop-
erty. In the case of government owned property, the social obligation norm 
might offer better protection of common property rights but this would 
depend on the social obligation norm being interpreted as an obligation to 
encourage equality and democracy. If the social obligation norm was in-
stead interpreted as a variant of the nuisance doctrine, then it would have 
little impact on the current jurisprudence concerning government-owned 
property. In fact, it could be argued that Canadian courts already impose 
a social obligation norm in cases of government-owned property. Alexan-
der’s solution, therefore, would not offer a stronger understanding of 
common property. 
 Both Singer and Alexander were attempting to conceptualize ways to 
fix private property, and as a result, they both suggest limits on owners 
which already exist for common property, at least in Canada. In Canada, 
the Charter acts as a limit to what the government can do with the prop-
erty that it is considered to own. The jurisprudence makes it clear that 
Charter limitations do not automatically apply to all forms of government-
owned property. What the jurisprudence and its government-as-owner 
analogy overlooks is that it is not the owner of the property that is the key 
differentiation of property, but the public’s relationship with that proper-
ty. Arguably, the use test attempts to capture the public’s relationship 
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with government-owned property, but the use test should be the first step, 
not the second in any analysis of publicly-accessible government-owned 
property. 
 In addition to the Charter limitations on government-owned property, 
Canadian environmental lawyers have recently looked to the American 
public trust doctrine as a way of further limiting the government’s ability 
to regulate its property freely.180 I am sceptical of such attempts given the 
weakness of the doctrine in Canada and the Canadian courts’ refusal to 
recognize such a doctrine.181 Furthermore, the primary concern of envi-
ronmental lawyers is to find a way to grant environmental groups stand-
ing to challenge government failures to protect the environment.182 As 
laudable as such attempts might be, Canadian courts are unlikely to rec-
ognize such a doctrine without its express incorporation in legislation.183 
In addition, it is not clear how the public trust doctrine would operate in 
the context of streets and parks.184 Nevertheless, increased Canadian in-
terest in the American public trust doctrine does suggest frustration with 
the current understanding of the government’s rights to its property. 
 In order to recapture a stronger understanding of common property, it 
is helpful to remind ourselves of the public’s rights to such property. As 
Macpherson noted, common property rights attach to individuals in the 
form of a right not to be excluded. The state or the government creates 
and enforces these rights but as the exclusionary right—often called the 
core of ownership—attaches to individuals and not the government, the 
government cannot be considered the owner of such property.185 In fact, 
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the government only manages such property or holds it in trust for the 
public benefit. Yet the government-as-owner analogy suggests that it is 
not the government’s use of the property. 
 The bundle of rights theory of property suggests how the government 
as owner analogy appeared. As already noted, the dominant understand-
ing of this theory has collapsed into a description of private property own-
ership and when courts apply it to common property, the government ap-
pears to act like an owner. The exclusionary stick in the bundle of rights 
theory is generally understood as the right to exclude others. In the case 
of common property, as was observed in SA, there may be situations 
where an individual has to be excluded from such property by the gov-
ernment. It appears as though common property’s exclusionary right 
vests in the government, not the public, and therefore the government 
appears to be the owner of the property. In addition, the government ap-
pears to set the agenda for common property and such an action is, ac-
cording to Katz, the key definition of ownership.186 Thus, not only does the 
government appear to exclude others, it also appears to have the final say 
over how such property is used. In this way the bundle of rights theory 
obscures the fact that common property is held for the benefit of the pub-
lic and is not owned by the government. 
 As common property is under-theorized, it is easy to forget that an in-
dividual has different rights to common property than to private property. 
Common property’s exclusionary right is the right not to be excluded ra-
ther than the right to exclude others. A close examination of common 
property’s exclusionary right reveals that the government does not actual-
ly have the right to exclude others but a duty to uphold the right not to be 
excluded. An individual’s exclusion from common property is potentially 
only temporary and it is only done to prevent others from being excluded. 
In SA, for example, a teenager was prohibited from ETS property because 
she committed assault in one of Edmonton’s light rail stations.187 Alt-
hough the Alberta Court of the Queen’s Bench in SA, upheld the ban on 
the grounds that it did not infringe the teenager’s Charter rights,188 the 
need to prohibit violent offenders from certain pieces of common property 
would protect the enjoyment of such property for others. In such cases, 
the government performs a balancing action, which is more like a mana-
gerial action than the action of an owner. The government does not have 
the right to exclude anyone from common property but it has a duty to 
uphold the right not to be excluded which, paradoxically, may have the ef-
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fect of requiring certain individuals to be excluded. Like all rights, the 
right not to be excluded is not absolute and must be balanced with the 
rights of others. 
 In the case of public parks, for example, municipalities typically ex-
clude all citizens from the park at night or regulate parks in such a way 
so that it is impractical to use them at night. Such regulation of municipal 
parks better protects the park for all citizens as it prevents the park from 
being “worn out”. Overnight exclusion from the park actually better pro-
tects the right not to be excluded during the day. This argument, though 
it contains several flaws which are beyond the scope of this article to en-
gage with, was put forward by the City of Victoria in Adams.189 The un-
derpinning idea is that exclusion at certain times, or of certain people (or 
of certain behaviours which have the effect of excluding, such as prohibi-
tions on camping), work to ensure that the vast majority of the public will 
be able to continue to access such common property. While it is true that 
the government appears to set the agenda for common property, it only 
does so as a representative of the people.  
 What the government-as-owner analogy obscures is the role of the 
government as the representative of the citizenry. The use of representa-
tives or agents is an accepted legal practice but, crucially, representatives 
or agents act on behalf of others and not in their own interest. The trust 
analogy of common property recognized that the government held com-
mon property for the benefit of the public. In contrast, the government-as-
owner analogy grants the government the same rights as private property 
owners but for the limitations of the Charter. Thus, it fails to recognize 
that when it comes to common property, the government acts on behalf of 
the public and not for its own ends. 
 In order to reclaim a stronger understanding of common property the 
government-as-owner analogy needs to be either abandoned or modified. 
A complete abandonment of the analogy seems unlikely as it is applicable 
for items of state property or “private government property”. In the case of 
common property, the government ought to be considered the owner only 
insofar as it is the public’s representative, and certainly should not be 
considered to have the same property rights as any private property own-
er. Ideally, the government-as-owner analogy would be replaced with the 
trust analogy in cases dealing with common property which would allow 
the Charter to continue to apply to how governments regulate common 
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property but would also recognize that common property has always ex-
isted and continues to exist for the benefit of the public. 
Conclusion 
 Despite the absence of a robust understanding of common property in 
recent Canadian property jurisprudence, common property clearly still ex-
ists. It is important that such property is recognized as a distinct form of 
property because it provides a contrast to private property’s vision of 
property. Common property necessarily requires us to pay attention to 
how others might need to use such property and it forces us to pay atten-
tion to others in ways that private property does not. Some have even ar-
gued that common property acts as a form of justification for private 
property.190 However, the communicative and linking functions of common 
property mean that it does more than justify private property: these func-
tions mean that common property is essential to the proper functioning of 
a democratic society. 
 The trust analogy of common property recognizes that the government 
is not the owner but is responsible for ensuring an individual’s right not to 
be excluded from such property. Admittedly it is a moderately more com-
plex analogy than the government-as-owner but it highlights the public 
nature of common property. The trust analogy also presents a more equi-
table vision of common property which recognizes that it is for the benefit 
of all, not just those with private property rights. 
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